

**NAME**

**mac\_none** - null MAC policy module

**SYNOPSIS**

To compile the null policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

```
options MAC
options MAC_NONE
```

Alternately, to load the none module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

```
options MAC
```

and in loader.conf(5):

```
mac_none_load="YES"
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **mac\_none** policy module implements a none MAC policy that has no effect on access control in the system. Unlike `mac_stub(4)`, none of the MAC entry points are defined.

**Label Format**

No labels are defined for **mac\_none**.

**SEE ALSO**

`mac(4)`, `mac_biba(4)`, `mac_bsdextended(4)`, `mac_ddb(4)`, `mac_ifoff(4)`, `mac_lomac(4)`, `mac_mls(4)`, `mac_partition(4)`, `mac_portacl(4)`, `mac_seeotheruids(4)`, `mac_stub(4)`, `mac_test(4)`, `mac(9)`

**HISTORY**

The **mac\_none** policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

**AUTHORS**

This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

**BUGS**

While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack

channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.